Notes and Comments: Right to Counsel at Prison Disciplinary Hearings by Seff, Mark A.
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 2
Issue 2 Spring 1973 Article 5
1973
Notes and Comments: Right to Counsel at Prison
Disciplinary Hearings
Mark A. Seff
University of Baltimore School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Seff, Mark A. (1973) "Notes and Comments: Right to Counsel at Prison Disciplinary Hearings," University of Baltimore Law Review:
Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol2/iss2/5
NOTES AND COMMENTS 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT PRISON DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS 
I am society's collector of debts, and 
my purse is the bottomless maw of time 
insatiably storing the payments of days 
implacably totaling the months and the years . .. 
Come-come and look upon the faces of these I hold 
and see thereon the reflection of my image, 
engraven as a deep and final proof 
of society's inadequacy, of man's inhumanity . .. 
I am gut-searching anguish destroying the man 
who is with desperate hope, 
waiting 
for the letters, the visitors, that never come . .. 
Yes, I AM THE PRISON 
Wherein the smothering confines of a steel-barred cage 
crush with the weight of inhuman reality; 
wherein the' endless emptiness of the days 
and the shattering loneliness of the eternal nights, 
repeat and repeat and repeat my message . .. endlessly. I 
The developing judicial attitude toward prisoners' rights is that" [a] 
prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those 
expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law.,,2 The 
older retributive view of penology, that the inmate was a "slave of the 
state" with minimal legal rights,3 has been discarded, not only because 
of humanitarian influences, but also by way of necessity in the wake of 
inmate rebellion. This note will explore and analyze the effects of a 
budding trend to require legal counsel at prison disciplinary hearings 
based substantially on fourteenth amendment due process require-
ments. 
1. CURRENT STATE OF PRISONERS' RIGHTS 
Traditionally, prisoner complaints alleging unconstitutional treat-
ment have been ignored by the courts, and judicial review has been 
avoided under the "hands-off" doctrine on the grounds that the 
1. Hunt, R. L., I Am The Prison, 1 PRISON L. REP. 1 (Oct. 1971) (Poem by Inmate, Ariz. 
State Prison). 
2. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 225 U.S. 887 (1945). 
3. "He [the convicted felon] has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, 
but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to him. He is 
for the time being the slave of the State." Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. (21 Gratt.) 
1024, 1026 (1871). 
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handling of prisoners was a complicated task which required expertise 
that the courts admittedly did not possess.4 This doctrine was applied 
so mechanically that a claim which alleged that a prisoner had been 
beaten to death would go unreviewed. s 
-- As a result, this immunity from judicial scrutiny prevented the public 
from acquiring knowledge of prison conditions and led to a breakdown 
in the corrections phase of the criminal process. The central problem 
was that, more often than not, prison administrators and staff also 
lacked the requisite expertise to deal with prison conditions.6 
The Supreme Court recognized this problem by abolishing the 
"hands-off" doctrine 7 in the landmark case of Johnson v. Avery, 8 
stating that "where state regulations applicable to inmates of prison 
facilities conflict with [federal constitutional] rights, the regulations 
may be invalidated.,,9 Therefore, it appears that the "courts 
[are] ... replacing the 'hands-off' approach with a determination of 
the reasonableness of the regulation.,,1 0 
The primary vehicles eroding the "hands-off" doctrine have come in 
the areas of religion, I I censorship, I 2 and access to the courts I 3 and to 
4. The "hands-off" doctrine has been justified in the following manner: inasmuch as Con-
gress has placed control of the federal prison system under the Attorney General, and 
inasmuch as the control of a state prison system is vested in the Governor or his delegated 
representatives, a federal court is powerless to intervene in the internal administration of 
this executive function even to protect prisoners from the deprivation of their constitu-
tional rights. See, e.g., United States ex rei. Morris v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d 
105 (7th Cir. 1953), Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 
822 (1952); Platek v. Aderhold, 73 F.2d 173 (5th Cir . .1934). 
For another interpretation of the "hands-off' doctrine see Millemann, Prison Discipli-
nary Hearings and Procedural Due Process-The Requirement of a Full Administrative 
Hearing, 31 MD. L. REV. 27, 36 n.44 (1971): "The doctrine is best described as a self-
imposed limit on jurisdiction based upon respect for federal-state comity and a defer-
ence to the expertise of prison administrators." 
5. State, ex reI. Clark v. Feriing, 220 Md. 109, 151 A.2d 137 (1959). 
6. Ashman, Rhetoric and Reality of Prison Reform, The Daily Record (Baltimore) Aug. 29, 
1972, at 1, col. 5. 
7. See Note, The Inadequacy of Prisoners' Rights to Provide Sufficient Protection for Those 
Confined in Penal Institutions, 48~N.C.L. REV. 847, 849 n.8 (1970). 
8. 393 U.S. 483 (1969). 
9. Id. at 486. 
10. See Note, The Problems of Modern Penology: Prison Life and Prisoners' Rights, 53 
IOWA L. REV. 671, 671-72 (1967); cf. Haines v. Keiner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). 
11. The cases now establish that prisoners have rights to gather for corporate religious 
services, to consult a minister of their faith, to possess religious books like the 
Koran and Message To The Blackman in America, to subscribe to religious litera-
ture, including Muhammad Speaks, to wear unobtrusive religious medals and 
other symbols, to have prepared a special diet required by their religion, and to 
correspond with their spiritual leader .... [Hlowever, ... where prison officials 
can make an affirmative showing that the religious sect in question abuses ... 
[these various rights,l ... reasonable limitations may be imposed. 
Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights Litiga-
tion, 23 STAN. L. REV. 473, 484 (1971). 
12. See generally Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971), in which inmates were 
given the right to send letters concerning prison management to the news media, as long 
as those letters did not contain or concern control and plan of escape, or device for evad-
ing prison regulation; in Van Ermen v. Schmidt, 343 F. Supp. 377 (W.D. Wisc. 1972), the 
court stated that Wisconsin officials must show "compelling interest" to justify rule pro-
1973] Prisoner's Right to Counsel 265 
counsel. 1 4 "By recognizing that the Constitution's protections extend 
through prison walls, [the recent trend has] set the stage for the 
application of due process principles to prison [disciplinary hear-
ings] .,,15 
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AT PRISON 
DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS 
The courts in recent years have been more willing, as in other areas 
of prisoners' rights, to examine inmates' alleged denials of procedural 
due process at prison disciplinary hearings. Since "[i] t is now well 
established that incarceration does not mean that prisoners have no 
constitutional rights,"! 6 the forums in which these rights have been 
challenged must now, in order to prevent arbitrary treatment, adhere to 
judicially established safeguards. 1 7 The Federal District Court for 
Maryland, in Bundy u. Cannon, 1 8 discussed the nature of procedural 
due process in the prison setting in stating that the type of proceeding 
necessary to guarantee a particular right depends upon "[t]he nature of 
hibiting receipt of law books other than from publisher; Sostre v. Otis, 330 F. Supp. 941 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), held that incoming books and periodicals may not be censored unless 
the inmate is given notice that the literature was being censored and unless the censor-
ship was rendered by a body that would be expected to act fairly; the court in Fortune 
Society v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D. N.Y. 1970), stated that prisoners have a right 
to receive any publications except those that the prison can show a clear and present 
danger to security or involve some other compelling interest; and in Palmigiano v. Tca-
visono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.!. 1970), the court entered a temporary restraining order 
ending the reading and censorship of all incoming and outgoing mail, including that of 
courts, government officials and attorneys. 
13. See generally Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941) (state prisons may not abridge or impair 
an inmate's right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus); Sostre v. Mc-
Ginnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972) (prison officials 
may not punish inmates for bringing suit against the prison administration); Meola v. 
Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass.1971) (prison officials may not confiscate or delay 
legal pleadings or correspondence addressed to the courts); Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. 
Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), afrd sub nom. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (prison 
officials must establish a library which insures that indigent prisoners can obtain a fair 
hearing by the judiciary). 
14. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (legitimized the "jailhouse lawyer"); Goodwin v. 
Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1972) (prison official required to deliver letters from the 
Legal Aid Society to inmate-clients advising them on legal status of a prisoner's union); 
Smith v. Robbins, 454 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1972) (court enjoined inspection of incoming mail 
from attorneys for contraband unless done in the inmate's presence); Jansson v. Grysen, 
Civil No. 6-130-71 C.A. (N.D. Mich. June 5, 1972) (jail authorities may not open or restrict 
length of inmate's mail to or from official or attorneys). 
15. Millemann, supra note 4, at 37. For an extensive discussion of prisoner's rights. see Ren-
t!ral/y Hollen, Emerging Prisoners' Rights. 33 OHIO ST. L.J. (1972); .symposium: PrIS-
oner's Rights, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 154 (1972); Tibbles, Ombudsmen for American 
Prisons, 48 N. OAK. L. REV. 383 (1972). 
16. Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165, 172 (D. Md. 1971), citing Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 
333 (1968); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d 
Cir. 1971); Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966). 
17. Comment, Intra-Penal Disciplinary Proceedings, 1971 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 618, 627. 
18. 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971). 
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the alleged right involved, 'the nature of the proceeding, and the 
possible burden on that proceeding .... ,,1 9 
To determine whether the requirements of due process apply to 
prison disciplinary hearings a "balancing test" has been suggested,2 0 
whereby the courts, in examining the rights of the prisoners, must 
balance the necessities of managing and administrating a prison against 
the inmate's interest in the right in question.2 1 The Supreme Court, in 
Goldberg v. Kelly/2 stated that the affording of procedural due 
process is "influenced by the extent to which [one] may be 
'condemned to suffer grievous loss,' ... and depends upon whether 
the ... interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental 
interest in summary adjudication.,,2 3 
It must then be decided when to invoke the "balancing test," i.e. 
what is the nature of the inmates' liberty, and when must it be 
protected by pro,cedural due process? The federal courts24 are in 
agreement that the loss of "good conduct time,,,2 5 which has the effect 
of extending the inmate's stay in prison, and the imposition of 
segregation or solitary confinement, which may affect the inmate's 
sanity,26 both involve a sufficiently grevious loss of liberty to require 
due process hearings. Furthermore, an adverse disciplinary record may 
affect the inmate's eligibility for parole.2 7 
The traditional rebuttal by the state to prison disciplinary due 
process hearings is that there is no right to good time and maximum 
institutional freedom; instead, they represent good time as a privilege 
granted by the state to the prisoner. However, the Supreme Court has 
refuted this argument in the landmark case of Morrissey v. Brewer, 2 8 in 
19. [d. at 172, citing Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). 
20. See Millemann, supra note 4, at 34. 
21. Hermann, Schwartz, Kolleeny, Campana & Harvey, Due Process in Prison Disciplinary 
Proceedings, 29 GUILD PRAC. 79, 80 (1972). 
22. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
23. [d. at 263, citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) 
(Frankfurter J., concurring). See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (citing fa-
vorably the Goldberg standard); Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 
(1961). ' 
24. See cases cited note 36 infra. 
25. Millemann, supra note 4, at 40 n.63 states: 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 700 (b}-(d) (1971) authorize five days a month diminu-
tion of sentence for inmates "not guilty of a violation of the discipline or ... rules" 
,of the institution and an additional five days monthly for inmates who excel in their 
employment or maintain satisfactory progress in educational and training courses. 
Section 700 (e) requires the forfeiture of that "good time" which is earned in the 
month in which an inmate violates prison rules or exercises a lack of fidelity or care 
in the performance of his work or in his educational and vocational training. 
Section 700 (e) also empowers the Department of Corrections to deduct "a por-
tion or all" of an inmate's "good time" as punishment for any of the above-men-
tioned delinquencies. 
26. See Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N. Y. 1970), affd in part, rev'd in part, 
modified in part sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971). 
27. Hermann, supra note 21, at 84. 
28. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
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stating that: "It is hardly useful any longer to try to deal with this 
problem [parole revocation] in terms of whether the liberty is a 'right' 
or a 'privilege.' By whatever name the liberty is valuable and must be 
seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment."29 The 
Sands v. Wainwright30 court recently stated that the "rights-privileges" 
distinction is nonexistent, i.e. once a privilege is granted, the inmate is 
entitled to it. Therefore, procedural due process comes into play when 
the entitlement is taken away. 
Once it has been established in a particular case that the inmate may 
suffer grievous loss or that the inmate's right outweighs the prison's 
interest in impairing that right, it is necessary to determine the specific 
protections the courts are employing to effect that inmate's right of 
procedural due process. Initially, some courts have indicated that due 
process standards were not met in the particular disciplinary hearings 
without going so far as to state what constituted adequate standards. 
For example, in Talley v. Stephens, 3 I a prisoner had been summarily 
whipped for alleged violations. The court enjoined use of the strap until 
its use was surrounded by appropriate due process safeguards, but the 
court did not discuss what would constitute appropriate safeguards. 
More recently, a similar position was taken in Sostre v. McGinnis, 3 2 
where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals overruled an order that the 
inmate petitioner may not forfeit earned good time credit unless 
specific procedural protections were implemented.33 However, in 
overruling the District Court, the Court of Appeals stated: "[W] e are 
not to be understood as disapproving the judgment of many courts that 
our constitutional scheme does not contemplate that society may 
commit lawbreakers to the capricious and arbitrary actions of prison 
officials."34 In other words, while recognizing the inmate's right to due 
process, the court did not indicate its approval of specific delineated 
procedural protections.3 5 
Other courts have been more precise in their approach to the 
29. [d. at 482. 
30. Civil No. 71-339-Civ-J-S (M.D. Fla., Jan. 5, 1973). 
31. 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965). See also United States ex rei. Campbell v. Pate, 401 
F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1968). 
32. 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971). 
33. The specific procedural protections included: "(a) written notice of the charges against 
him; (b) a recorded hearing before a disinterested official with a chance to cross-examine 
adverse witnesses and call witnesses in his own behalf; (c) the right to retain counsel sub-
stitute; and _ .. (d) a written decision ... ," [d. at 195. 
34. [d. at 198. 
35. However, the court did relent and to some extent indicated what process was "due": 
If substantial deprivations are to be visited upon a prisoner, it is wise that such ac-
tion should at least be premised on facts rationally determined. This is not a con-
cept without meaning. In most cases it would probably be difficult to find an in-
quiry minimally fair and rational unless the prisoner were confronted with the 
accusation, informed of the evidence against him, and afforded a reasonable op-
portunity to explain his actions. 
[d. (citations omitted). 
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question of what constitutes due process. In Bundy v. Cannon, 3 6 
seventy-two inmates involved in a work stoppage were transferred from 
a medium security institution (Maryland House of Correction), to the 
punitive segregation quarters of a maximum security institution 
(Maryland Penitentiary). Seventeen of the seventy-two inmates accused 
of specific acts of misconduct were to be indefinitely confined in 
segregation at Maryland Penitentiary, forfeit five days of good conduct 
time, and lose another hundred days upon approval of the Com-
missioner of the Department of Corrections. The other fifty-five were 
to be confined in segregation at the penitentiary for at least thirty days. 
In none of the cases did the inmate receive, prior to his hearings, 
written notice of any charges or allegations of misconduct, nor was he 
provided with representation at the hearing or allowed to present 
witnesses of his own or to cross-examine his accusers. The. Federal 
District Court for Maryland held that punishment imposed in this 
manner violated the requirements of procedural due process. 
While the Bundy decision was still pending, the Department of 
Corrections promulgated the following rules: 3 7 
1) The inmate shall be furnished a written statement of the charges 
not later than forty-eight hours after the ~leged violation, and the 
inmate will appear before the disciplinary adjustment team within 
seventy-two hours of the alleged infraction; 
2) A hearing shall be held before an impartial tribunal in all cases 
which could result in the imposition of serious punishment;3 8 
3) The inmate shall appear before the adjustment team to discuss his 
case and he shall be represented by another inmate or a staff member 
(if the accused or representative desires); 
4) The inmate may call witnesses (including his accusers) and may 
question such witnesses; 
5) The adjustment team shall make a written report of the 
proceedings to include a summary of the evidence, the team's 
36. 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971). See cases cited note 16 liupra. See also Krause v. 
Schmidt, 341 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Wis. 1972), in which inmates won a preliminary in-
junction against disciplinary sanctions imposed without procedural due process. The 
court imposed Bundy procedural protections; Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 
(E.D. Va. 1971), applied Bundy due process requirements to disciplinary hearings in a 
Virginia state prison whenever there was an imposition of solitary confinement, transfer 
to maximum security, loss of good-time, or 10 day padlock confinement; Clutchette v. 
Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-2357, 9th Cir., 
Aug. 30, 1971, held that state-instituted disciplinary proceedings at San Quentin had to 
be· halted until some due process, equivalent to that in Bundy, was instituted; Morris v. 
Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970), outlined detailed procedural due process 
guidelines; cf. Kritsky v. McGinnis, 313 F. Supp. 1247 (N.D. N.Y. 1970), affd 456 F.2d 79 
(2d Cir. 1971) (en bane), cert. granted sub nom. Oswald v. Rodriguez, 407 U.S. 919 (1972). 
37. 328 F. Supp. at 175. The cited rules apply only to major infractions (possible confinement 
for more than fifteen days in segregation and/or the loss of good time of more than five 
days). 
38. The Maryland Department of Corrections employs hearing officers to satisfy this require-
ment. 
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evaluation and decision, and the reason for such decision. The decision 
of the team must be based on substantial evidence; 
6) The inmate shall be informed of the decision and may appeal if he 
objects to the decision. 3 9 Judge Thomsen indicated his approval of 
these standards in his opinion.4 0 
The trend toward recognizing the inmate's constitutional right to 
procedural due process has expanded since the Bundy decision. In 
Collins v. Schoonfield,4 I the court granted specific due process rights 
to pre-trial detainees in Baltimore City Jail who were threatened with 
confinement in isolation or solitary confinement;42 and in United 
States ex rei. Neal v. Wolfe,43 a Pennsylvania inmate won a $514.60 
damage judgment against the state prison officials for sixteen days of 
solitary confinement, and loss of job status imposed without due 
process of law. The court recognized that due process demanded the 
imposition of standards similar to those recognized in Bundy, i.e. 
advance notice of charges, a hearing before an impartial tribunal, and 
the opportunity to call defense witnesses and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses. In Brown v. Schubert,4 4 when the superintendent of a state 
hospital ordered the confined plaintiffs to be transferred to maximum 
security facilities after learning that the patients had mailed letters to 
the press, the district court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary 
injunction because the transfers were made without due process of law; 
reference was made to Bundy-type procedural protections. In Lathrop 
v. Brewer,45 the court ruled that the prison officials' failure to contact 
inmates' witnesses in disciplinary proceedings resulted in a denial of 
confrontation and cross-examination which constituted a violation of 
due process and therefore rendered the proceedings null and void. 
Prisoners' procedural due process rights were further recognized in 
Sands v. Wainwright,46 which not only granted Bundy procedural 
protections to Florida prison inmates, but also allowed inmates to 
retain counsel at disciplinary hearings.4 7 
39. The rules provide that the warden shall review all cases involving major violations. The 
author of this note, a former employee of Maryland Diagnostic·Reception Center, wit· 
nessed several disciplinary proceedings in which the hearing officer always informed 
the inmate that his decision was appealable. 
40. 328 F. Supp. at 174. Accord, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
41. 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972). Although Collins was a case involving constitutional 
rights of pre· trial detainees (persons who have forfeited no rights due to conviction), this 
circumstance alone does not distinguish the Collins rule from other decisions involving 
prisoners. The state has the same interest in the speedy disposition of a disciplinary case 
in both jail and prison situations; the pre-trial detainee and prison inmate have the same 
interest in avoiding segregated confinement. 
42. Id. at 273-74. See also Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. 1972). Contra, 
Clements v. Hamilton, Civil No. 7001 (W.O. Ky., May 3, 1972). 
43. 346 F. Supp. 569 (B.D. Pa. 1972). 
44. 347 F. Supp. 1232 (E.D. Wis. 1972). 
45. 340 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Iowa 1972). 
46. Civil No. 71-339-Civ-J-S (M.D. Fla., Jan. 5, 1973). 
47. Id. 
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III. RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT PRISON DISCIPLINARY 
HEARINGS 
A. DUE PROCESS 
Against this background of emerging prisoners' rights in such areas as 
first amendment freedoms, right to access to the courts, and the right to 
procedural due process, there is an emerging attitude that prisoners are 
entitled to assistance by counsel at disciplinary hearings.48 The 
underlying premise is that the right to counsel in all criminal 
prosecutions, as a necessary ingredient of due process, is a fundamental 
right, and that the state is precluded from abridging that right unless 
there is a "compelling state interest" to be safeguarded.49 The 
historical basis for this concept is found in Powell v. Alabama,s 0 in 
which the Supreme Court held that a failure of the state court to 
appoint counsel in a capital case violated "fundamental fairness," 
thereby denying fourteenth amendment due process protection. The 
Court reasoned that a valid hearing has always included the right to the 
aid of counsel and that "[ t] he right to be heard would be, in many 
cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by 
counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and 
sometimes no skill in the science of law."s 1 
48. Brief for Appellant at 21, Nieves v. Oswald, Dkt. No. 72-1974 (2d Cir. 1972), setting forth 
the following commentators who urge the presence of counsel at prison disciplinary hear-
ings: 
Hollen, Emerging Prisoners Rights, 33 Ohio St. L. J. 1,60 (1972); Turner & Daniel, 
Miranda in Prison: The Dilemma of Prison Discipline and Intramural Crime, 21 
Buff. L. Rev. 759 (1972); Forys, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners, 55 Mili. L. Rev. 
1,39 (1972); Brant, Prison Disciplinery [SIC 1 Proceedmgs; Creating Rights, 21 Clev. 
St. L. Rev. 83 (1972); Singer, Confining Solitary Confinement: Constitutional Argu-
ments for a "New Penology," 56 Iowa L. Rev. 1251, 1292 n.188 (1971); Millemann, 
Prison DiSCiplinary Proceedings and Procedural Due Process, 31 Md. L. Rev. 27 
(1971); 1 Kraft, Prison Disciplinary Practices and Procedures, 47 N. D. L. Rev. 
9, 71 (1970); Jacob, Prison Discipline and InmatelRights, 5 Harv. Civ. Libs.- Civ. 
Rts. L. Rev. 227, 247 (1970). Note, Scope of 14th Amendment Due Process: Right 
to Counsel in Disciplinary Proceedings, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 275. Note, Decency and 
Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role for Prison Reform, 57 Va. L. Rev. 841, 874-75 
(1971); Note, Procedural Due Process in Prison Disciplinary Proceedings, 2 Loy. 
L. J. 110 (1971); Note, Procedural Due Process for Peno-Correctional Administra-
tion: Progressive and Regressive, 45 St. Johns 468, 483 (1971); Note, Federal Court 
1lltervention in State Prison Disciplinary Hearings to Guarantee 14th Amendment 
Due Process, 17 Wayne L. Rev. 931,949 (1971). See also NSCD, A Model Act for 
the Protection of Rights of Prisoners § 4 (1972); President's Commission on Crim-
inial Justice and Administration, Task Force: Corrections 86 (1967). 
49. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 70 (1932). 
50. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
51. [d. at 68-69. Contra, Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 
390 U.S. 1028 (1968) (no right to counsel at disciplinary proceeding against high school 
student); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967) (no right to counsel at dis-
ciplinary proceeding against cadet attending Merchant Marine Academy). These cases 
are distinguishable from prison disciplinary hearings because the amount of personal 
liberty at stake in prison hearings entitles a prisoner to greater protection than the poss-
ible suspension or expulsion from a school or college. Furthermore, most students are bet-
ter able to protect their rights than presumably less-educated prison inmates. Millemann, 
supra note 4, at 56 n.60. 
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More recently, the Supreme CourtS 2 has interpreted the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment as incorporating the protections of 
the sixth amendment, thus making them applicable to the states. 
Although the accused now has a right to counsel in all cases involving 
the imposition of one or more days of incarceration,s 3 along with the 
recognized pre-trial protections,s 4 the courts until recently have been 
reluctant to afford right to counsel protections after sentencing. S S 
However, in Mempa v. Rhay, S 6 the Supreme- Court held that as a 
result of due process requirements, a defendant had a right to counsel 
at a post-trial proceeding for revocation of his probation since 
imposition of deferred sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal 
proceeding materially affecting the substantial rights of the accused. 
Mempa arose under a Washington State laws 7 which requires the 
sentencing judge to impose the statutory maximum, but also requires 
that he submit his recommendation to the parole board regarding the 
length of time the prisoner should serve.s 8 Though the final 
determination of the sentence is the responsibility of the parole board, 
the judge's recommendation is usually given considerable weight. The 
Supreme Court held that the right to counsel attaches at the hearing to 
determine the judge's recommendation; counsel is deemed necessary for 
marshalling the facts, introducing evidence of mitigating circumstances, 
and giving general aid and assistance to the defendant in presenting his 
case as to the length of sentence to be served. Although many courts 
have interpreted Mempa as restricting the right to counsel to sentencing 
proceedings and denying the assistance of counsel where the defendant 
has been sentenced but has not yet been placed on probation,S 9 
Mempa is more accurately "an important incursion by the federal 
judiciary into the state peno-correctional area.,,6 0 The distinction lies 
52. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
53. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
54. See generally Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (appointed counsel required at pre-
liminary hearing); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (appointed counsel required 
when suspect taken custody); Escobedo v. lllinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (appointed coun-
sel required when the investigation focuses on the individual suspect); Hamilton v. 
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (appointed counsel required at arraignment). 
55. See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971). 
56. 389 U.S. 128 (1967). 
57. See REV. CODE WASH. ANN. §§ 9.95.010, 9.95.030 (1961). 
58. 389 U.S. at 135. 
59. See, e.g., Shaw v. Henderson, 430 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1970); Brown v. Warden, 351 F.2d 
564 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028 (1966); United States v. Hartsell, 277 F. 
Supp. 993 (E.D. Tenn. 1967). See also Knight v. State, 7 Md. App. 313, 255 A.2d 441 
(1969) {probationer may be represented at hearing by counsel but an indigent has no right 
to have counsel appointed unless due process would be affronted. But see Laquay v. 
State, _ Md. ~ 299 A.2d 527 (1973) (although sentence had already been imposed, an 
indigent probationer was denied due process, under the circumstances, by lack of ap-
pointed counsel at the revocation hearing). 
60. Note, Federal Court Intervention in State Prison Internal Di.~ciplinary Hearings to Guar-
antee Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 931, 949 
(1971). For decisions requiring the presence of counsel at parole revocation hearings see 
Mozingo v. Craven, 341 F. Supp. 296 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Goolsby v. Gagnon, 322 F. Supp. 
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in the fact that in Washington the judge has no choice in determining 
the length of the sentence; it is set by statute and ultimately 
determined by the parole board. In other states, the judge has full 
responsibility for setting sentence. The role of counsel in Mempa is to 
produce facts for indirect use by the parole board in determining 
whether the probationer's conditional liberty will be revoked. The 
Court's reasoning, that counsel is required at every stage of a criminal 
proceeding where the substantial rights of the accused may be affected, 
implicitly recognized that penal proceedings affecting the freedom of 
the individual and the form of his incarceration require counsel to 
protect his personal liberty, i.e. his substantial rights.6 I By analogy, 
since prison disciplinary decisions affect the freedom of the accused 
inmate (revocation of good time extends his sentence) as well as the 
form of his incarceration (institutional confinement versus solitary 
confinement), Mempa arguably requires counsel at disciplinary hearings 
to protect the substantial rights of the accused inmate.6 2 
The Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to rule on the issue 
of the right to counsel at post-trial proceedings in Morrissey v. 
Brewer.63 Although the Court applied Bundy due process protections 
to parole revocation hearings, the majority refused to rule on whether a 
parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained counsel, or to appointed 
counsel if he is indigent.64 Three justices felt that the Court should 
460 (E.D. Wis. 1971); People ex rei. Combs v. LaVallee, 29 App. Div. 2d 128,286 N.Y.S. 
2d 600 (1968); Commonwealth v. Tinson, 433 Pa. 328, 249 A.2d 549 (1969); and for deci-
sions requiring the presence of counsel at probation revocation hearings see Mempa v. 
Rhay, 389 U.S. i28 (1967); Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 19(9); 
Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 40. U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. 
June 26, 1972) (No. 71-1225); Perry v. Williard, 247 Ore. 145, 427 P.2d 1020 (1967); 
Oestrich v. State, 55 Wis. 222, 198 N.W.2d 664(1972) (requires counsel at probation and 
parole TPvocation hearings). 
61. See Comment, Due Process: The Right to Counsel in Parole Release Hearings, 54 IOWA L. 
REV. 497, 503 (1968). In administrative hearings where the personal liberty of a party is at 
stake, the proceedings closely approximate criminal proceedings and therefore require 
the presence of counsel. Examples of such hearings requiring the presence of counsel in 
most jurisdictions include commitments for insanity or communicable disease and com-
mitments under several psychopathy laws. 
See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 A, § 4(b)(5) (1971), which provides that legal represen-
tation shall be provided to indigents III ·any ... proceeding where possible incarceration 
pursuant to a judicial commitment of individuals in institutions of a public or private na-
ture may result." 
62. See Note, supra note 60, at 949. which states: "The liberal reading of Mempa therefore 
calls for the right to counsel in prison disciplinary hearings because determination of 
length of incarceration is an obviously 'critical stage' where rights of the prisoner are af-
fected; and parole decisions are based on inmate conduct as determined by the prison 
disciplinary board." 
See also Smith & Pollack, After Conviction: Therapy or Punishment, 1 STUDENT LAW. 
7, at 51 (1973), which states: "The [Mempa] decision ... may be ... an important first 
step in broadening the post-adjudicatory rights of probationers, prisoners and parolees." 
(emphasis added). 
63. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
64. See Singer, Morrissey u. Brewer: Implications for the Future of Correctional Law, 
PRISON L. REP. 287 , 289 (1972), which states: 
[T]he Court's reluctance to hold that there was a right to counsel may stem from 
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have ruled on the right to counsel question: Justices Brennan and 
Marshall stated that the parolee must at least be allowed to retain 
counsel,6s while Justice Douglas expressed the view that the parolee 
should be entitled to counsel.66 This dilemma was discussed in 
Sands,67 where the court denied inmates the right to appointed 
counsel. The Court recognized, however, that although there is no duty 
upon the state to furnish counsel in prison disciplinary proceedings, an 
inmate must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires.6 8 
While it has not been conclusively stated by the courts that inmates 
have the right, or must be allowed, to retain counsel at disciplinary 
proceedings, this procedural safeguard has been applied in differing 
areas of civil administrative proceedings. Using the previously discussed 
"balancing test" where private interests are at stake, counsel is allowed 
when a welfare recipient may be denied benefits,69 or where a public 
housing tenant may be evicted. 7 0 Prisoners who arguably have a 
potentially greater interest at stake than welfare recipients and public 
housing tenants, still are not allowed or have the right to legal counsel 
in most jurisdictions.7 I The court in Landman v. Royster 72 
recognized the potential severity of prison discipline 73 and concluded 
that inmates should be entitled to representation by retained counsel at 
proceedings which threaten these interests since these "deprivation [s] 
may be momentarily as telling as the loss of financial support or 
housing .... "7 4 
Furthermore, while there is no significant disparity between the 
conditional liberty 7 5 at stake in prison disciplinary hearings and the 
two other considerations: (a) the issue was not directly before the Court; (b) this 
opinion was written by Chief Justice Burger who would have had to repudiate in 
toto his opinion in Hyser v. Reed, were he to find that there was a right to counsel 
at the parole revocation hearings. 
See also Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 
3617 (U.S. June 26, 1972) (No. 71-1225), which presents before the Supreme Court the 
question of the right to counsel at probation proceedings. 
65. 408 U.S. at 491. 
66. [d. at 498. 
67. Civil No. 71-339-Civ-J-S (M.D. Fla., Jan. 5, 1973). 
68. [d. at 28. 
69. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
70. Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 
U.S. 1003 (1971). 
71. While staff or inmate substitute counsel are required· in many jurisdictions. legal counsel 
is not even allowea upon request. See, e.g., Bunay v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 
1971); Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.1. 1970). Contra, Sands v. Wainwright, 
Civil No. 71-339-Civ-J-S (M.D. Fla., Jan. 5, 1973). 
72. 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971). 
73. ld. at 652, stating: 
74. [d. 
A man in solitary confinement is denied all human intercourse and any means of di-
version. Padlock confinement isolates the individual as well from his fellows. Maxi-
mum security confinement is a lesser penalty, but like the others it interrupts a 
prisoner's efforts at rehabilitation and curtails many recreational activities. Loss of 
good time credit may in effect amount to an additional prison sentence. 
75. Inmate conditional liberty encompasses institutional freedom from solitary confinement 
and traditional freedom which is denied by the inability to earn good time. 
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conditional liberty at stake in probation or parole revocation hearings, 
probationers and parolees, in a growing number of cases, are entitlec;l to 
legal assistance.7 6 Other situations which require presence of counsel 
include: the possibility that the defendant may be imprisoned for one 
day,77 the possibility of commitment to a mental institution,7 S and 
possible confinement in a juvenile institution.7 9 Certainly "the interest 
which [prisoners] have at stake in these disciplinary hearings is 
substantial enough, and indistinguishable enough, from the above-cited 
interests to require representation by retained counsel when that 
interest is to be revoked."s 0 
As previously discussed, where prisoners show a grevious loss of 
liberty, the right to counsel should attach at disciplinary hearings' unless 
the state will be unduly burdened. Such state interests will certainly 
encompass the argument that the presence of counsel will delay 
disciplinary hearings and will constitute an undue administrative burden 
upon prison officials and the conduct of disciplinary hearings.s I 
Although the delay is possibly significant since it seemingly erodes the 
principles that punishment should be speedy and that pre-hearing 
detention should be short, "[ t] he question is not whether, because of 
delay, counsel should be excluded but rather, what reasonable rules and 
regulations would allow the presence of counsel without exacerbating 
the delay problem."s 2 One court solved this problem by stating that "a 
prisoner who desires to secure counsel ... may reasonably be limited to 
four days."s 3 This state interest in summary adjudication, however, 
ignores the other goal of the disciplinary process, i. e. accuracy in 
finding facts and the fairness of the result. 8 4 One reason for the 
Supreme Court's requirement, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 8 5 of counsel in 
any criminal case carrying a potential prison sentence is that the 
preserrce of counsel can play some role in slowing down "assembly-line 
justice.,,86 
Other state interests include the burden which would be placed upon 
prison officials if prisoners were allowed legal counsel. The prison staff 
76. See cases cited note 60 supra. 
77. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
78. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968). 
79. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also State ex rei. Bernal v. Hershman, 54 Wis. 2d 626, 
196 N. W.2d 721 (1972) (requires counsel at proceedings to revoke juvenile's "liberty under 
supervision"). 
80. Brief for Plaintiff at 34, Inmates v. McColley, Civil No. 72·764-M (D. Md. 1973) [herein., 
after cited as Brief for Plaintiff), citing Collins v. Schoon field, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 
1972); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Krause v. Schmidt, 341 
F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Wis. 1972). See also Campbell v. Rodgers, Civil No. 1462·71 
(D.D.C., Jan. 11, 1972), where an amended consent order provided for representation by 
counselor law students at disciplinary hearings in the District of Columbia jail. 
81. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 38. 
82. Id. at 39. See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
83. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 654 (E.D. Va. 1971). 
84. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 39. 
85. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
86. Id. at 36. 
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would have to contact the inmate's attorney; indigent inmates would 
conceivably claim they are entitled to appointed counsel if such 
representation may be retained by financially able inmates;8 7 and the 
disciplinary hearings may be disrupted by the presence of counsel 
intimidating legally untrained hearing officers. 
While these contentions may justify limiting the role of counsel, they 
do not constitute such a "compelling state interest" as to weight the 
"balancing test" in favor of the state: 1) requiring prison employees to 
make telephone calls is certainly not a substantial burden on the state 
justifying the total exclusion of legal counsel from disciplinary 
hearings;88 2) the presence of counsel will not subvert the authority of 
the hearing officers since the rules of evidence do not apply to these 
proceedings;89 3) the hearing officer is fully empowered to order the 
attorney to leave if he causes. any problems;90 and 4) there are 
administrative settings which allow the presence of counsel though the 
hearing officer is without legal training.9 I Regarding an indigent 
inmate's claim to appointed counsel, it is well accepted that "the state 
may choose to solve part of a problem without dedicating itself to a 
complete solution.,,9 2 Even if there were some requirement for 
appointing counsel to represent indigent inmates, there are adequate 
legal sources available without placing the expense of providing counsel 
upon the state.93 Constitutional rights, however, cannot be denied 
87. Millemann, supra note 4, at 56 n.15, states: 
[Griffin v. Illinois], 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Although there is no constitutional right 
to appeal, if trial transcripts are provided to those inmates who can afford them for 
purposes of preparing for appeal, they cannot be denied to indigents. See Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (the giving of an opportu-
nity to have retained counsel at a hearing is likely to mean that it is necessary to 
allow indigents to have appointed counsel at such hearings); Earnest v. Willing-
ham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969) (if a parole board allows the use of retained 
counsel at a parole revocation hearing, it is required by the equal protection clause 
to have counsel appointed for those less financially fortunate). See also Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
88. In Inmates v. McColley, Civil No. 72-764-M (D. Md. 1973) (a case now in litigation involv-
ing the right to counsel at prison disciplinary hearings), the plaintiffs' expert witness, in 
describing the disciplinary system at the Kansas State Penitentiary, stated that tele-
phoning attorneys for inmates imposed a minimal additional burden on the penitentiary 
staff. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 22. 
89. Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165, 172 (D. Md. 1971). 
90. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 42. 
91. See MD. ANN CODE. art. 41, § 109 (1971) (parole system places responsibility for revoca-
tion decisions with the parole board, the members of which are not required to be attor-
neys); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486 (1972) (independent decision maker at a 
parole revocation hearing need not be a lawyer). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 
(1970); Caulder v. Durham Housing Auth., 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970). 
92. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 41, citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); 
Sands v. Wainwright, Civil No. 71-339-Civ-J-S (M.D. Fla., Jan. 5, 1973) (no right to ap-
pointment of counsel in hearings, but inmate may retain counsel if desired). 
93. The Maryland Public Defender System and the Baltimore Legal Aid Bureau's Prisoner 
Assistance Project are examples of potential sources. Also, third year law students would 
be qualified to represent prisoners. Cf, MD. R. CIV. P. 18(c) (allowing 3d year students to 
appear in court under supervision of counsel). Many law schools have prisoner's aid 
programs which could be of assistance. 
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because of a lack of funds. 9 4 The role of counsel in this setting is not 
to challenge the role of correctional officers, but to develop facts which 
aid in reaching a fair decision.9 5 
B. THE CLUTCHETTE AND MIRANDA DILEMMA 
In the context of the prison disciplinary setting, many of the 
offenses committed by inmates also constitute crimes, whereby the 
inmate may be prosecuted by the state. Some of these offenses include 
charges of assault against another inmate (or on a guard), possession of 
weapons, rioting, possession or sale of drugs, and escape. At their 
option, prison adjustment teams refer cases to the district attorney. In 
these situations, the accused inmate is given the standard Miranda 
warnings,96 including his right to remain silent, his right to counsel and 
the fact that anything he says at the disciplinary hearing may be used 
against him at his subsequent trial. "Should he [the inmate] then ask 
for the assistance of counsel, either retained or appointed, he is told 
that this right attaches only when he is questioned by the district 
attorney.,,9 7 The dilemma faced by an inmate in this predicament is 
that, should he choose to remain silent pursuant to his fifth amendment 
rights; the disciplinary committee may still proceed to adjudicate his 
case; thus the inmate is compelled to give up the right to present an 
affirmative defense. "Should he desire to make a statement in his own 
behalf, for example, a statement that he did do the act with which he is 
charged but the circumstances were such as to mitigate his disciplinary 
punishment, he does so at the peril of having his "confession" admitted 
as evidence in a state prosecution.,,9 8 
To solve this dilemma, the court in Clutchette v. Procunier99 
decided, among other available choices,l 00 that the prisoner must be 
afforded counsel, not a counsel-substitute, when he is charged with a 
prison rule violation which may be punishable by state authorities. In 
94. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th 
Cir. 1968); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. 
Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). 
95. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 42 n.106 (plaintiffs expert witness testified that he, 
as chairman of the disciplinary board, often discharged some of the responsibilities which 
would normally be those of a "prosecutor"). 
96. See also Turner & Daniel, Miranda in Prison: The Dilemma of Prison Discipline and In-
tramural Crime, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 759, 761 n.ll (1972) [hereinafter cited as Turner]. 
97. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 777 (N.D. Cal. 1971), appeal docketed, No. 
71-2357, 9th Cir., Aug. 30, 1971. 
98. Id. 
99. 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971). 
100. See Turner, supra note 96, at 764-65, which states: 
[Instead of granting the inmates the right to counsel, other available alternatives 
are]: ... (1) no disciplinary punishment at all would be imposed and the state 
would rely on criminal prosecution as the only sanction; ... (3) a statutory or judi-
cially implied immunity would be provided, permitting the inmate to defend him-
self in the disciplinary proceeding without the risk that his statements could be 
used against him in the criminal prosecution; (4) the officials could decline, as a 
1973J Prisoner's Right to Counsel 277 
Miranda, "the Supreme Court recognized that custodial interroga-
tion I 0 I of a person suspected of a crime 'contains inherently 
compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to 
resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so 
freely.' ,,102 Therefore, the Court held that procedural safeguards must 
be employed to protect the fifth amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination when a person suspected of criminal conduct is held 
in custody for questioning. I 03 In the subsequent case of Mathis v. 
United States, I 04 the Supreme Court stated that prisoners are entitled 
to Miranda warnings when there is a chance that an incident will be 
criminally prosecuted. I os The court in Clutchette reaffirmed this 
principle, conduding that "[ t J he need for protection of the [fifth 
amendment J privilege is even greater in the context of prison 
disciplinary hearings because there is even greater pressure to abandon 
the privilege caused by the necessity of conducting a defense to 
administrative charges.,,1 0 6 In any proceeding in which an accused 
party exercises his right to remain silent, he sacrifices one means of 
defense. However, in the normal criminal prosecution, the defendant 
still retains the means of defending himself by having his attorney call 
and cross-examine witnesses. Furthermore, the defendant is entitled to 
the presumption of innocence with the burden of proof (beyond a 
reasonable doubt) on the state, a procedural safeguard unheard of 
within the prison hearing room. Putting a choice to the prisoner to 
abandon one right in favor of another is unquestionably unconstitu-
tional.1 07 
The logical argument against the application of Miranda rights to 
prison disciplinary hearings is that the inmates are protected by the 
"prophylactic" exclusionary rule. I 08 However, application of this rule 
would not protect inmates against the risk of volunteering statements 
matter of policy, to give the Miranda warnings, thus rendering inadmissible in 
court whatever statements the prisoner might make in the disciplinary proceed-
ing; and (5) the disciplinary proceeding would be postponed until after the crimi-
, nal prosecution had concluded. 
101. "By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers 
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any 
significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (emphasis added). 
102. Carter v. McGinnis, 351 F. Supp. 787, 792 (1972), citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
467 (1966). 
103. 384 U.S. at 478. 
104. 391 U.S. 1 (1968). 
105. [d. at 4. 
106. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 51. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 778 
(N.D. Cal. 1971), which states: "The prisoner, warned that anything he says may be used 
against him in a criminal prosecution, is put to the choice between remaining silent and 
sacrificing his right to defend himself before the committee, or speaking to the committee 
and risking incriminating himself in a future prosecution. The trap is unavoidable." 
107. 328 F. Supp. at 779. See also Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967); Spevack v. 
Klein, 388 U.S. 511, 515-19 (1967); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968); 
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-85 (1968). 
108. All evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment 
is inadmissible in federal and state court. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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which unintentionally incriminate them, 1 09 or against the use of 
involuntary statements for impeachment purposes in subsequent 
criminal prosecutions. 1 1 0 
Recently, the court in Carter v. McGinnis, 1 1 1 was faced with the 
same dilemma recognized in Clutchette. In reaching the conclusion that 
the sentences imposed upon the plaintiff-inmates unconstitutionally 
penalized their privilege against self-incrimination, the court refused to 
follow the Clutchette rationale. Instead, it stated that either counselor 
an inmate granted immunity would provide adequate procedural 
safeguards, but since neither of these protections was made available, 
the inmates' rights were violated. On the other hand, the Sands ' 1 2 
court totally rejected the Clutchette solution, stating that "it is yet not 
certain that even counsel can ... vitiate the constitutionally obnoxious 
dilemma: it is then still as substantial as if the attorney were not 
there.'" 1 3 The court, however, in recognizing the prisoner's predica-
ment, granted accused inmates "use" immunity to the extent that his 
statements would not be used affirmatively against him in future 
criminal prosecutions. 1 1 4 
If this immunity trend gains acceptance, inmate's right to counsel 
based on the fifth and fourteenth amendments will be refuted. 
Nonetheless, due process requires that prisoners have the right to retain 
counsel at prison disciplinary hearings. 
C. THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN INSURING BUND¥ RIGHTS 
Given the constitutional right of inmates to a full hearing before 
imposition of major punishment, it is essential that counsel be allowed 
to participate in order to insure a fair and impartial result. Such a due 
process hearing is "adversarial," or "adjudicatory,'" 1 5 "insofar as it 
applies pre-existing policies or rules to particular factual determina-
tions.'" 1 6 This setting logically calls for the skills and talents which 
only a lawyer can successfully exhibit. 
Prison authorities, on the other hand, assert that counsel-substitute 
adequately safeguard the interests of the accused inmate. 1 1 7 They 
109. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). 
110. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Inmates v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 
1971). 
111. 351 F. Supp. 787 (W.D.N.Y. 1972). 
112. Civil No. 71-339-Civ-J-S (M.D. Fla., Jan. 5, 1973). 
113. [d. at 36. 
114. Sands v. Wainwright, Civil No. 71-339-Civ-J-S at 37 (M.D. Fla., Jan. 5, 1973). 
115. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, §§ 7.02-.04 (1972). 
116. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 35. Contra, Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 196 
(2d Cir. 1971). 
117. As a former employee of the Maryland prison system who has witnessed disciplinary hear-
ings at the Maryland Diagnostic-Reception Center, this writer believes that the use of 
counsel-substitute is worthless. Prison staff members representing accused inmates of-
ten did not speak at all in the defense of their "clients" and were discouraged from call-
ing witnesses or cross examination. Legal counsel could have been helpful to the ac-
cused and to the disciplinary board in articulating the facts. 
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reason that inmate and prison staff representatives are more familiar 
than legal counsel with the prison make-up and can therefore better 
communicate with the prison adjustment team. This reasoning is faulty 
in that many inmates lack the forensic, ability to communicate 
adequately. Inmate-representatives invariably engage in irrelevant 
argument and fail to focus upon issues central to the conditional 
freedom of the accused. 1 1 8 Furthermore, correctional officers and 
staff often resent being cross-examined by inmates, thus creating an 
atmosphere of tension in the hearing room. 
Frison staff representatives are similarly inadequate because of the 
obvious conflict in roles: employed by the institution on one hand, and 
representing the accused inmate on the other. For this reason inmates 
do not often request representation by staff at disciplinary hearings. 1 1 9 
In view of the inadequacy of either prison staff or inmate 
representation, the only choice left to the accused inmate is to attempt 
to defend himself at the hearing. This is obviously inadequate, due to 
his lack of the training which would enable him to articulate possible 
mitigating circumstances. He is often totally incapable of recognizing 
and effectively rebutting factual statements made against him. His dual 
role of advocate and subject of the inquiry leaves him in a position 
from which he would not be able to make an objective analysis of the 
impact and significance of the charges made by his accuser.l 2 0 Finally, 
he cannot have the opportunity to investigate his case adequately 
because he is locked in his prison cell. 
Legal counsel would enjoy all the advantages which the prisoner 
lacks as his own advocate: counsel would be able to take an objective 
view of factual statements and allegations. The diligent attorney 
certainly could put together a more accurate picture of the particular 
incident by interviewing witnesses and accusers and obtaining relevant 
documents from the inmate's file, thereby benefiting both the inmate 
and the adjustment team. He would be able to determine whether the 
testimony of a particular witness would be helpful to the accused 
inmate, thus saving time. To help further shorten the procedure, 
counsel could be responsible for insuring that accused inmates 
understand the charges against them and thus avoid the necessity of 
repetitiv'e notice. 
Presently in Maryland, a prison employee (such as a social worker) is 
responsible for the time-consuming task of informing the inmate that 
he has been charged with a violation and that he has various (Bundy) 
rights. If counsel were allowed and designated by the particular inmate, 
the prison employee would simply inform the attorney that the inmate 
has been placed in segregation for a prison violation and desires counsel. 
118. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 54. 
119. At ninety-five hearings of major violations at the Maryland House of Corrections between 
June 1 and August 7, 1972, counsel-substitute was employed on only thirteen occasions. 
[d. at 57. 
120. See Comment, supra note 61, at 503. See also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). 
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The burden would then be upon counsel to inform the inmate of the 
charges and his rights and to conduct further investigations necessary to 
present the inmate's case adequately. Therefore, "[i]n the context of a 
prison disciplinary hearing, the role of counsel would be to utilize legal 
skills to. ,adequately develop facts which may be the premise for 
punishment.") 2 ) 
Another consideration in favor of the attorney's presence is the fact 
that disciplinary hearings are not open to the public.) 2 2 One of the 
most important protections against official arbitrariness is publicity. In 
such a setting, where all of the participants in the hearing are employed 
by the prison or the state, "it may well be that only the representation 
of counsel can avoid a summary and coercive atmosphere."! 2 3 The 
analogy to the parole revocation process is relevant in that "[t] he 
presence of an attorney at a parole revocation hearing may be even 
more necessary than that presence in a courtroom because of the 
close-knit, almost family-like, atmosphere that prevails at parole 
hearings. ,,! 2 4 
Other ways in which counsel could be of assistance at the 
disciplinary hearings include acting as a "buffer" between the inmates 
and correctional officers who refuse or express hostility at being 
questioned by the prisoners.) 2 5 This could serve to alleviate tensions in 
the hearing room that inevitably result from inmates conducting 
cross-examinations. Finally, it is important for rehabilitative purposes 
that inmates perceive disciplinary proceedings as fair and just;! 2 6 with 
an attorney present, there is a greater likelihood that this will be 
accomplished. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The plight of the prisoner has, in recent years, struck a responsive 
chord in the judiciary. It is apparent that many courts have abandoned 
the "hands-off" approach in dealing with prisoners' rights, examining 
instead the reasonableness of the particular institutional rule in 
question. To determine whether such a rule meets the requirements of 
reasonableness, the courts have implemented a "balancing test," 
involving the relative interests of the state and the prisoner. The result 
has been a virtual explosion of new standards and safeguards that have 
121. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 23. 
122. Even state legislators in New York have been banned from disciplinary hearings. The 
matter is currently in litigation in the Supreme Court, Erie County, New York. Brief for 
Appellant, Nieves v. Oswald, Dkt-No. 72-1974 (2d Cir. 1972), at 21. 
123. C{. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968); Blyden v. Hogan, 320 F. Supp. 513 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
124. Dyke, Parole Revocation Hearings in California: The Right to Counsel, 59 CAL. L. REV. 
1215, 1227 n.49 (1971). 
125. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 80, at 28. 
126. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
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given the prisoner a measure of dignity. This can only help the 
much-maligned rehabilitative process that our prison systems are 
reluctantly beginning to implement. In order to protect these newly 
acquired rights, the prisoners' right to the assistance of counsel at 
prison disciplinary hearings must become effective. The presence of 
counsel in this setting can help guarantee the integrity of the system 
and can force the adjustment team, through questioning of values and 
assumptions, to make needed appraisals. 1 2 7 If this progressive trend 
continues, there is an excellent prospect that the right to counsel will 
truly become an effective one. 
Mark A. Seff 
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